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Senior Research Staff on International Communism

**SPECULATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE
XXI CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION**

(27 January 1959)

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This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated. It is based on information available to SRS as of 28 December 1958.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The XX Congress of the CPSU (14-25 February 1956) was a landmark in the history, not only of the Party, but of the modern world. From it emerged one of the most spectacular actions of the post-war period, the "secret" speech of Nikita Khrushchev, denouncing the "cult of personality" of Stalin and the "criminal" actions of the dictator against the Party itself. Several doctrinal "modifications" were set forth, notably the "non-inevitability" of war between the capitalist and the socialist "systems," the possibility of a non-violent "parliamentary takeover" of political power in certain - unspecified - countries, and the legitimacy of "different roads to socialism." The immediate consequences of the XX Congress were devastating; a wave of confusion spread throughout International Communism, culminating in October in the effort of Poland to take up its "national road" and in the Hungarian revolt against Communist domination. The year 1957 was marked by a determined drive on the part of the Soviet Union, aided by Communist China, to restore stability to the shaken movement, an effort which by the middle of 1958 was largely successful. The second half of 1958 may be characterized as a period of preparation for a new dynamic surge of the "socialist system," the "Great Leap Forward" in China and the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) of the Soviet Union.

2. The XXI Party Congress, which will begin on 27 January 1959, ushers in a "new historical period of a gradual passage from socialism to communism." With what may be regarded as a certain measure of elasticity, Khrushchev has declared that "the long term plan of development of the Soviet Union for the next fifteen years provides for the creation of

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the indispensable conditions for the completion of the transition to communism." The magnitude and significance of this program invest the Congress with a gravity and moment which the Free World cannot afford to disregard.

3. It should be noted that the XXI Congress, unlike the XX, is not a regular Party Congress, which according to CPSU statutes should be held every four years. Rather this is designated as "neocherednoi" - not in the regular series - hence, extraordinary rather than statutory. Since there is no established precedent for a Congress of this type, it is not possible to determine precisely the proceedings which will be followed. It seems probable, however, that this Congress, unlike those in the regular series, will not be the occasion for announcing major changes in the Party structure, the Central Committee, or the Presidium. There is a parallel to earlier practice in the holding of preparatory sessions at the Republic level, but these are not being used for the development of an agenda. Indeed, the agenda is already specifically laid down in two cardinal documents: Khrushchev's Seven Year Plan Theses and the Theses of the Central Committee on Education. These have been amplified and underlined by other documents and utterances, notably Khrushchev's Report on Agriculture to the Central Committee (15 December).

4. In attempting a speculative forecast of the XXI Congress, we must be mindful of the possibility that it will yield a number of surprises. The two sets of Theses will undoubtedly be the framework of the proceedings, but, if the pattern of the XX Congress is followed, there will be other themes, doctrinal and pragmatic, some of which may be electrifying to Communists and even to ourselves. These, of course, are difficult to forecast, and we must recognize that no amount of speculative ingenuity can cope with the initiatives of a dynamic directing group which knows how to exploit the virtues of surprise and manipulation under a mantle of consummate secrecy.

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5. Accordingly this essay seeks primarily to interpret the program which has been announced, adding, wherever possible, a few adumbrations of what may be unveiled. The best we can hope for is to be caught somewhat less off balance than we were in February 1956.

GENERAL THEME

6. The central theme of the XXI Congress will be the transition within the USSR from the completed state of "socialism" to building the foundations of "communism." This is clearly held by the USSR to be a step in which it, alone among the "socialist" states, can take the lead. Firmly, if politely, Communist China is being relegated to a following role. In fact, it has actually been demoted from the relatively advanced stage in the process of development which had previously been accorded to it. This is subtly brought out in the October 1958 slogans of the CPSU, the latest in the series of semi-annual formulations which authoritatively set forth the hierarchical relations within the Bloc. Thus, as recently as the slogans of May 1958, China had been hailed as a "builder of socialism," a slightly ambiguous term which tends to imply that the process of "building" has been completed. But in the October slogans, China is grouped along with most of the European satellites as "building socialism," a process clearly not yet completed. The significance of this down-grading is pointed up by the recent announcement that lowly Bulgaria has now virtually completed the "building of socialism" and is nearly ready for the higher step of "transition to communism." It seems probable that Czechoslovakia will soon be added as a third member of the elect group, possibly at the Congress itself. Both these satellites, of course, will follow the leadership of the Soviet Union in this transition.

7. China, in the meantime, appears to have accepted the tactful admonitions of the USSR to slow the pace of com-

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munalization and to moderate the "utopian" claims and promises which accompanied the process in its first moments of enthusiasm. It is not certain whether the XXI Congress will attempt any further steps to reaffirm Soviet leadership. Probably it will be content to express friendly approval of the Chinese experiment, acknowledging that it may be more useful as a model to the underdeveloped countries than Soviet experience, which has now reached such a high stage as to be beyond the reach of imitation except in advanced industrial economies.

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION

8. The XXI Congress will be predominantly an occasion of great programmatic significance for the USSR itself. It will unfold in an aura of self-congratulation for mighty achievements and of self-exhortation to vastly greater efforts in the future.

9. At the same time a dialectical counterpoint on the dominant theme will be woven from the relations of the Soviet Union with the other members of the Communist Bloc. There is now in being, according to Moscow, a united world "system" of socialist states, confronting the hostile and aggressive "system" of capitalism and imperialism, headed by the USA. The development of the "socialist system," which emerged after World War II, is alternatively described under two terms: "camp" (lager') and "commonwealth" (sodruzhestvo). The "camp" is usually portrayed in an external context of militancy, might and monolithic unity. It corresponds to the aggressive-defensive aspects of Soviet and Bloc foreign policy, and, as such, is the more insistent note. The "commonwealth" is represented more loosely, a unity of equal, independent, sovereign states, motivated by the Five Principles of Bandung in the spirit of brotherly cooperation and mutual assistance. The root of the word sodruzhestvo itself connotes friendship; hence the term sets forth the benign, pacific image with which Moscow seeks to soften the defiant implications of the "camp" -

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including perhaps the Germanic military origin of the Russian word.¹

10. The unfolding of the concept of the socialist "system" must be set in a context of organization, the cardinal principle of Leninist-Bolshevik revolutionary activity. International Communism has twice established and dissolved a mechanism for the governance of the relations between the national parties: the Comintern (1919-43) and the Cominform (1947-56). The crisis and stabilization of the movement in the second half of 1956 and the beginning of 1957, raised in a new form the requirement for some mechanism to insure doctrinal unity. After much public and secret discussion, a successor to the Cominform journal was launched in Prague (August 1958) and published in fifteen languages, of which the English edition is entitled World Marxist Review. It remains to be seen whether this journal will fully meet the requirements of the movement. Quite possibly the Party Congress will canvass the matter further, though not openly.

11. There is considerable evidence that this Congress, like its predecessors, will take advantage of the presence of "fraternal delegations" to discuss - behind the scenes - problems of central guidance and regional diversity. It is unlikely that anything comparable to a new Comintern will be announced, but we may be sure that directing elements in the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU will lay down broad and detailed programs for action. The concept of "proletarian internationalism" will be applied elastically to insure the stability and unity of the socialist "system," and the way will be held open to the creation of a tighter mechanism of control if the flexible approach proves inadequate.

¹ SRS is preparing a more detailed study of the concept of the Commonwealth and its prospective role in the governance of the socialist "system."

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INTERNATIONAL THEMES

12. It is probable that the triad - "system, " "camp, " "commonwealth" - will figure prominently in the XXI Congress speeches, with the weight of emphasis on the "camp." Despite the atmosphere of confidence, growing out of the successful stabilization campaign of 1957, the mood of the Soviet leaders is still tense, vigilant and stern. Nevertheless, "peaceful co-existence" and "relaxation of tensions" will be proclaimed as the goals of Soviet foreign policy, and the record of offers and proposals on disarmament, cessation of nuclear testing, disengagement and mutual security arrangements will be contrasted with the obdurate "war-mongering" of the "aggressive" Free World alliances.

13. Within this dialectic of peaceful professions and rugged defiance, the Congress will seek to advance the gains which Moscow and Peking have reaped from the recent series of international crises which they have provoked. Whether the provocation of crises such as Quemoy and Berlin is to be regarded as intrinsic to the advance of Bloc foreign policy interests or as primarily designed to stimulate energies for the great internal programs which are being launched, must be regarded as moot. Judging solely by external evidence of recent months, we would be inclined to anticipate that the general tone of the Congress, in the foreign political field, will be predominantly "hard." Motions in the direction of conciliation, if they are made at all, are more likely to come outside the Congress in the form of dramatic gestures, a personal offer of Khrushchev to change the basis of negotiation over Berlin, or the dispatch of a special emissary with an unannounced mission, as in the case of Mikoyan's visit to the US.

14. If, however, specific new themes of international relations are set forth at the Congress, it is difficult to see in what respects they are likely to be of an accommodating

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nature. We would not anticipate any new positions with respect to disarmament which would "relax tensions" maintained at the two Geneva conferences, although there might be another commitment on the part of the USSR to cease nuclear testing without the condition of reciprocity by the US and UK. While recent criticism of the UN as ineffectual and as US-dominated might be repeated, there might also be new proposals to utilize its offices for negotiations, for example, on the Middle East or Berlin, or even on Korea and Vietnam. Despite recent sharp criticism of Nehru on the ideological level, Khrushchev might revert to the earlier theme of urging a summit meeting including India. The Congress will probably reiterate the willingness of the Soviet Union to aid backward countries in their struggle for national "liberation," but it will also be careful not to promise too much in the way of economic assistance, since such offers might be interpreted as inconsistent with the calls for heightened efforts to construct the material base of communism within the USSR. Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly be considerable flexing of economic muscle in the foreign field, and the attitude toward cooperation with Western powers in development programs will probably remain negative.

INTERNAL THEMES - THE TRANSITION TO "COMMUNISM"

15. Against the background of sustained world crisis, the Congress will unfold and expound the great mission of the CPSU in transforming the Soviet Union from a "socialist" to a "communist" society. This will be set forth as nothing less than the task of creating a new type of man - who might be called the "homo communisticus" - a new type of economy and a new type of society. The energizing force of this transformation is "placed on the agenda by life itself," whose potentiality is to be actualized through the genius and will of the Communist Party. The process itself involves indoctrination, economic construction and psychological conditioning.

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ECONOMIC

16. Inseparable from the ideal of a transfigured "communist man" is the economy which forms him. The essence of history, conceived in Leninist-Marxist dialectical terms, is the triumph of ever higher forms of material production. Without a greatly expanded material base, the "spiritual" values of communism cannot be attained. Hence, the Theses of the Seven Year Plan, like those of Education, are a proclamation of faith. The language and tone in which they are presented is calculated to foster enthusiasm and dedication.

17. It is difficult to see what the Congress speakers can say in the economic field which will go beyond the development of the themes already stated. Production goals and comparative statistics will undoubtedly be repeated ad nauseam.¹

18. It is possible, nevertheless, that a note of super-erogation will be introduced. It may be stated that these are the projectible goals on the basis of existing curves of productive capacity, but that they can be surpassed. A new impetus to economic construction will be sought in the heightened intensity of life and work according to "Communist" principles ("zhit' i rabotat' po kommunisticheski") as opposed to the prevailing level of mere "socialist labor." Discipline and incentive go hand in hand. Already the press abounds in stories of heightened zeal in organizing communist labor brigades. To the historically minded outsider these bear a suspicious similarity to the homely "pep talks" of the Stakhanovite era, and possibly their energizing effect will prove little greater. Never-

¹ The credibility of Soviet statistics with respect to past production and the possibility of realizing projected goals is analyzed by a number of experts in Soviet Survey No 26, October-December 1958.

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theless, it would be a mistake to view this new campaign too lightly. Endless repetition of the "catch up with and outstrip America" theme, according to the reports of many Western observers, has produced an electrifying effect on managers and workers alike. The "Great Leap Forward" of China has introduced a note of "brotherly" competition from abroad which may be enhanced by the very real fear that the "leaper" may eventually do the "outstripping."

19. We should not, therefore, be surprised if Khrushchev and the other speakers at the Congress proclaim that even the formidable goals of the Seven Year Plan are mutable and may be subject to upward revision before the seven year period is completed. The CPSU is seeking to renew its charge of dynamism with an act of will, drawing from sources which it believes to be undepleted. We should not assume that this is impossible.

EDUCATION

20. The theses on Education are organically related to the Seven Year Plan in laying down the course of the transition to communism. Since these have already stated clearly the methods and goals to be pursued, the proceedings of the Congress can actually do little more than repeat and exhort the Party to carry them out.

21. Nevertheless, the rationale of the program may become more explicit, and a serious effort may be made to evoke heightened popular support. For the program will not be universally popular. It restricts some of the advantages which the more privileged strata of Soviet society have enjoyed in procuring higher education for their children. Moreover, it injects a hard note of discipline and competition into a situation where relatively easy advance has been possible in the past.

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22. The central theme is the unity of education with the process of productive labor. This is derived from basic Marxist-Leninist doctrine on "polytechnical" education which is admitted to have eroded somewhat in recent years. Khrushchev on a number of occasions has conceded that an intellectual elite has emerged, often indifferent, if not hostile to manual labor. There has been a certain tendency to perpetuate the privileges of the higher party and professional cadres in their children through the process of education itself. It might almost seem as though Khrushchev had been stung by the critique of Milovan Djilas, whose picture of the "New Class" has not been disposed of by mere denunciation. The Congress speeches will certainly echo the theme of social levelling - upward, of course - through the combination of intellectual and manual work in the process of secondary education, as well as in more mundane ways such as the reduction of wage differentials.

23. But this process will not be presented as one of mere restraint on the ambitions of the more advanced social strata. It will also be described glowingly as the means of positive formation and transformation of man himself under the slogan of a new Soviet "humanism." Here, as in other instances, the Communists are attempting to seize and appropriate to their own purposes a lofty concept of the Western Free World tradition. They distinguish between the corrupted legacy of classic and Renaissance humanism which has survived in the ethos of the exploiting bourgeoisie and their own "true" form of humanism which is rooted in the "scientific" ideology of "historical materialism."

24. Nevertheless, there will probably be a certain ambivalence in the treatment of this "humanistic" motif.¹ It implies an element of "individualism," difficult to reconcile

¹ Cf. Ladislav Stall, "The Class Struggle and Humanism," World Marxist Review I, 3 (November 1958) pp. 27-30.

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by any propagandistic legerdemain with the "collectivism" which is basic to the ethos of the "communistic man." Moreover, it has been associated too closely for comfort with dissident and revisionist themes of what might be called the "romantic socialism" of the Polish intellectuals. Thus we may expect that the residual impact of all the talk on education will be pragmatic, the training of competent and willing vessels for the advancement of the economic and political objectives of communism. In this sense the new educational program may imply an increasing element of anti-intellectualism, perhaps attributable to Khrushchev's own bias.

25. This does not mean that the inspirational themes are insincere. The theses are eloquent in seeking to promote a sense of dedication in youth.

Experiencing the great happiness of creation, of giving birth to new life, our youth becomes enriched spiritually, acquires a revolutionary steeling, learns to value and to love what is most important and valuable in the life of the Soviet citizen - work for the good of society.¹

Khrushchev probably does believe that Soviet education will produce a society richer in "moral and spiritual" values, and that there will be a sort of Soviet Renaissance during the very process of transition to Communism. The Education Theses are careful to reserve an exception to the commandment of manual labor but it is limited to the "gifted few" in the creative and interpretive arts.

26. Khrushchev appears, also, to be convinced that this cultural Renaissance will take the form of a flowering

¹Seven Year Plan Theses, p. 94.

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of the "nationalities" of the Soviet Union, in which local traditions and art forms will be nurtured alongside the ever-growing Great Russian influence which permeates all the nationality areas. The Congress proceedings may thus turn out to be the occasion for glorifying a new "melting pot" conception, different from that of the United States in that national characteristics and art forms are cherished and unfolded rather than assimilated. The statement of the Education Theses that Russian and the local mother tongue of the nationalities will be taught on a plane of equality should not be taken as mere window-dressing, for the image of the Soviet Union as a multi-national state is intended to serve as the model of the broader - eventually world - commonwealth.

TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY

27. The Education and the Economic Theses set the frame for a radical transformation of socialist society. Herein, perhaps, lies the unannounced agenda of the Congress. The tone of many Party pronouncements in the post-Stalin era has suggested that the creation of a communist society cannot be accomplished through coercion alone. It must, in the end, reflect the spontaneous, general will of the people. Even as they have appropriated the concept of "humanism," the Communist leaders are claiming for their program the virtues of justice and freedom in a "true" form, contrasting essentially with their "bourgeois corruption" in the West.

28. The development of a society in which each will be provided for "according to his needs" is associated with the growth of "socialist legality" in a continuing educational process. In the past, the promised development of basic principles of "legality" has frequently been postponed by overriding considerations of "vigilance" against the "encircling" capitalist enemy. With the "decisive shift in the bal-

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ance of forces" between capitalism and socialism, and the emergence of a situation in which the latter may eventually "encircle" the former, and with the gradual elimination of "bourgeois remnants," the possibility of a "truly free" society at last may seem to arise before the eyes of the dedicated Communist. This would find its expression in an improved legal system. For several years Soviet jurists have been working on a set of draft principles for revising the criminal codes of the various Soviet Republics. Whether or not the time taken to complete their task denotes a lack of enthusiasm in the Party for the more "liberal" practices advocated by a substantial group of the jurists, the set of principles has been adopted by the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet (25 December 1958), and the way is presumably cleared for its application in revising the republic codes. A judgment concerning the degree of liberalization introduced by the new statement of judicial principles must await analysis of the changes made and of the future practice of Soviet courts.

29. But the provision of a reformed code of law would not in itself be sufficient to assure that Soviet society would become "free" in the Western sense. It is possible, indeed, that the XXI Congress will provide some assurance of further relief from police terror. The recent removal of Ivan Serov as head of the secret police may have pointed in that direction, though more likely it was connected with CPSU power factors, such as the elimination of the "anti-party group." In any event, the choice, as Serov's successor, of Aleksandr N. Shelepin - whose last position was directing the Communist youth organization, Komsomol - conforms to Khrushchev's practice of subordinating all potential centers of independent strength to Party control. There may be some reshuffle of the secret police - perhaps a new set of initials for the dread MVD - but we may doubt that the prudence of the Communist leaders would permit them at this stage to weaken the ultimate means of coercion. The adoption of the draft principles of law reform will probably be interpreted positively by the Soviet citizenry. Nevertheless, so long as there is a powerful secret police in being, permeating the whole of Soviet

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society with an informant system, formal "legality" cannot protect the citizen from the fear which blights freedom.

30. Indeed, viewing the concept of "socialist legality" objectively, we are entitled to conclude that it is neither a precondition of the "good life" nor an end in itself. Rather, we find in it a means to the end of "communist construction," an incentive to full acceptance of the driving discipline which must be imposed by the goals and pace of the program. Moreover, there is evidence that the Party itself is divided as to how far "legality" should be permitted to assume classic Western forms, emphasizing the sacred rights of the individual. There is a strong current toward "collective" forms of judgment and punishment. The experiment of the "anti-parasite laws," which place the sanctions against idleness, drunkenness, hooliganism, speculation and other anti-social acts in the hands of the citizenry itself, has not been universally adopted throughout the USSR, and it is probable that the more conventional juridical procedures of the Revised Criminal Code will eventually predominate. Failure of the Congress to lay down a clear course in the direction of "legality" would indicate that, in the minds of the CPSU leaders, no firm decision has been reached on the balance of legal stringency and relaxation in the march toward communism.

CONCLUSION

31. In conclusion, we may ask ourselves, if this should prove to be the general outline of the Party Congress Program, is it in fact something which will carry conviction and inspiration to the faithful of International Communism? Or will it, like the innovations and bold ventures of the XX Congress, precipitate an era of doubt and confusion throughout the movement, leading perhaps to disturbances comparable to those of October 1956?

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32. It is not within the scope of this essay to answer these questions. We may be confident that the eyes of Communists throughout the world will search the speeches of the Congress for light on what the process of "building communism" will actually entail. Above all, they will seek for clues as to the future position of man in a "communist" society. Will the educational reforms do away with the predominantly individualistic and "Western" orientation in which Soviet man has hitherto been formed? Or will the ideal, foreshadowed by the Chinese communes, of a truly collective man be adopted?

33. At this stage of our knowledge of Soviet programming for "communism" we may assume that a dialectical effort will be made to resolve the two concepts in a new "synthesis." The theoretical pronouncements of Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders indicate that they see no contradiction between the fulfillment of man as an individual through study of the humanities and sciences and his absorption in the collective unfolding of society through productive work.

34. Confronted with the necessity for taking at least a provisional stand on the competing claims of the individual and the collective, Khrushchev and the Party leaders probably will indulge in a certain amount of equivocation. On the one hand, they are aware that they still have to cope with remnants of Western molds. The popularity of Western - and in many cases specifically American - art, fashions, and consumer goods is constantly reproved by the Party, yet grows apace. The partial lifting of the Iron Curtain - which does not include cessation of jamming foreign broadcasts - still must be viewed by Khrushchev as a reversible gamble.

35. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders probably also feel that they can safely continue to impose collective forms of discipline and austerity, appealing from pride in achievements of the past to a powerful future glow of economic and political

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patriotism of a specifically Soviet nature. One may, indeed, speculate that Khrushchev has embarked on a basically "Stalinist" line of policy, calling for renewal of endeavor and sacrifice for a still distant goal. A possible consequence of such a line might be a new manifestation of the "permanent purge," perhaps not fully "Stalinist" in totalitarian ruthlessness, but "Leninist" in determination to eliminate laggard and apathetic elements of the cadres. The crescendo of attack against the anti-party faction, culminating in the classic device of Bulganin's staged confession, suggests that the XXI Congress may herald drastic measures, possibly even liquidation of "enemies of the people."

36. There are increasing signs of interest in determining some of the forms which a specifically Soviet form of Communism might take. Thus, Khrushchev speaks with approval of expanding creches, kindergartens, communal eating and catering, and other services which would free women from the "drudgery" of housework to engage in productive labor, and to enjoy greater opportunity for rest, culture and social activity. There is increasing emphasis on the inspirational and coercive role of labor brigades, peoples' militia and other forms of social organization. The superiority of state over collective farms is accented in Khrushchev's Agricultural Report to the Central Committee, and the final disappearance of the peasants' private garden plots and animals is foreshadowed. Throughout the Congress speeches we may anticipate repeated praise of the Party and of Khrushchev himself for approaching the creation of new institutional forms in the spirit of harmonizing "theory and practice," a euphemism for the proposition that whatever changes the leadership may decree are right because they represent an infallible application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

37. The full pattern of Soviet "communism" has not yet emerged and, possibly, the Soviet leaders themselves are waiting to see whether any valid lessons can be learned from

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the Chinese experiment. In any event, something further will probably have to be said by the CPSU on the Chinese development. Even among the satellites - Bulgaria and Albania especially - there has been a cautious expression of interest in the communes, and the CP's of densely populated and under-developed areas, such as India and Indonesia, are likely to find the Chinese experience more pertinent to their stage of evolution than the Soviet model. Possibly the answer will be of a guarded and interim nature, calling for further building of the communes as an example of potentially creative Marxism in the context of specific Chinese conditions. It is possible that Khrushchev will make some reference to the status of Comrade Mao since his relinquishment of the ceremonial office of Chairman of the CPR. Presumably Mao's ideological authority and his preeminence in the Party will be acknowledged and praised.

38. Whatever the clarifications or evasions on the critical question of China, there will be a major attempt to confound the ideological enemy, revisionism. This will be presented as a widespread dangerous heresy - far worse than its opposite, "dogmatism" - and the chief heresiarch will continue to be Tito. Lesser CP's will be adjured to maintain the purity of the faith and to avoid deviations such as recently split the Danish party. The attitude toward cooperation with Social Democratic parties has been hardening, and it is possible that the Congress will endorse recent stipulations that United Front efforts in the immediate future will have to come "from below" rather than at the level of the leadership.

39. On the whole, in spite of the inevitability of tirades, we may anticipate that the tenor of the speeches at the Congress will be hortatory and positive. Certainly, the proclamation that the Soviet Union is entering the transition from socialism to communism, if serious, is little short of epochal. If, on the other hand, it is merely a device to replenish the flagging

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zeal of a society which has struggled for forty years to become "socialist," the prospect of inevitable disillusionment and the reaction which it would engender is equally sobering. We do not know what the Soviet leaders, especially Khrushchev himself, really think they have created and are creating. With no model of historical experience and with only the doctrine of "scientific Marxism" to guide it, the extraordinary XXI Congress may prove to be either a sober act of faith or an irresponsible gamble. In either outcome, our own future is perilously involved, and we should study its course with profound concern.

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